a God (that is, a first mover or cause), is not only ineffectual and inconclusive; but also that, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated from that very topic of motion, that there can be no absolutely first uioyer, no first in the order of causes, that is, no God.

xiv. Tenthly, because the Theists conceive that though no body can move itself, yet a perfect cogitative and thinking being might be the beginning of all, and the first cause of motion ; the Atheists will endeavour to evince the contrary, in this manner. No man can conceive how any cogitation, which was not before, should rise up at any time, but that there was some cause for it, without the thinker. For else there can be no reason given, why this thought rather than that, and at this time rather than another, should start up. Wherefore this is universally true of all motion and action whatsoever, as it was rightly urged t>y the Stoics, that there can be no /aV??<ne eu/amoe, no motion without a cause, i. e. no motion, which has not some cause without the subject of it, or, as the same thing is expressed by a modern writer, " Nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it." Where- * fore, no thinking being" could be a first cause, any more than an automaton or machine could. To this purpose, it is further argued, that these two notions, the one of a knowing understanding being, the other of a perfectly happy being, are con-tradictious, because all knowledge essentially implies dependance upon something else, as its cause; " scientia et intellectus signum estpoten-tiae ab alip dependents, id quod non est beatissi-mum." They conclude, that cogitation, and all